An on-line primed monitoring study was used in an exploration of the nature of semantic memory loss in a patient (P.P.) with semantic dementia who showed a profound semantic impairment on a range of off-line tasks. Priming for pairs of words taken from a common category (e.g., cat-dog, spade-rake, ruby-emerald) was contrasted with that for word pairs from different categories that were related functionally (e.g., shampoo-hair, broom-floor, theater-play). Control participants showed robust priming for both types of semantic relation. P.P., in contrast, showed a normal priming effect for the functionally related conditions but no priming for category coordinates. This result suggests that P.P.'s semantic memory loss cannot be explained solely as a loss of stored representations or as a problem with deliberate controlled access to that information. Rather, elements of both explanations apply for different kinds of semantic information.
In a series of recent articles, Hodges, Patterson, and colleagues have described a patient, P.P., who has an exceptionally profound impairment of semantic memory (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992; Hodges, Patterson, & Tyler, 1993; . P.P. is described as having semantic dementia (Snowden, Goulding, & Neary, 1989) ; this is a form of progressive fluent aphasia characterized by a selective impairment of semantic aspects of language with relative sparing of other linguistic abilities, including phonology and syntax. Autobiographical, episodic, and short-term memory and visuoperceptual and nonverbal problem-solving abilities are also strikingly preserved, in contrast to the loss of semantic memory. Of the 5 patients of this type described by Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, and Funnell (1992) , P.P. had the most severe semantic memory impairment. Her performance on a battery of tests designed to assess semantic knowledge, via different input and output modalities, was already almost at floor level when she presented in 1990. For example, she was unable to generate a single exemplar to any of six semantic categories or to name any of the pictures presented to her, and her word-to-picture matching was no better than chance. Moreover, even the very limited amount of semantic knowledge exhibited during the earlier phases of testing (such as the ability to sort pictures at the level of living versus man-made and to engage in some meaningful conversation) deteriorated over the following 2</ 2 years (Hodges et al., 1993) .
As a result of their extensive investigations of P.P.'s performance on a range of tasks, Hodges et al. (1993) characterized her impairment as a selective loss of semantic memory. In its strongest form, this can be interpreted as the claim that the structures representing semantic knowledge-the meanings of words, the nature of objects, and factual information-have been destroyed as a result of the progressive brain damage underlying semantic dementia. P.P.'s almost total inability to use this information suggests that this kind of radical loss may be the correct account, perhaps more so than in other reported cases of semantic memory impairment, where there is a greater degree of retained information or the difficulty is more marked for a specific input or output route (Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) . However, a possible alternative interpretation of loss is that the semantic information is not destroyed, but rather fails to be retrieved when required. The distinction we are making here corresponds to that emphasized by Warrington and Shallice (1979) and Shallice (1988) between a disorder of storage, or representation, and one of access to information.
Although a central storage deficit seems the most natural account of a case such as P.P.'s, where semantic information appears to be totally inaccessible, whether from a spoken or written word, a description, a picture, or even real objects themselves, the possibility remains that semantic representations are preserved but could not be tapped by the kind of task reported in the previous studies. Although a wide range of tasks was used, including confrontation naming, picture-word matching, picture sorting, object sorting, and others, these tasks all share the characteristic of requiring controlled, deliberate access to semantic information rather than automatic access (Blumstein, Milberg, & Shrier, 1982; Chenery, Ingram, & Murdoch, 1990) . In other words, the tasks listed are all off-line, because participants are explicitly asked to access certain aspects of semantic information in order to perform the task (Tyler, 1992) . Our question was whether P.P.'s impairment could be due to an inability to access semantic information under voluntary control, rather than to a loss within the representational system itself. In order to address this question one must probe automatic access to semantic information using an on-line task. An on-line task is one in which participants are not explicitly asked to operate on the meanings of the words under study and in which a fast reaction time response can be tied closely in time to the processes of interest.
Semantic priming is an on-line task that can be used to tap automatic access to semantic representations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that in normal subjects recognition of a target word (e.g., dog) is facilitated by the prior presentation of a related prime word (e.g., cat) compared with an unrelated control word (e.g., bread ; Fischler, 1977; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press; Neely, 1991) . Because the only relation between the prime and the target is semantic (or associative 1 ), this facilitation is assumed to stem from their connections or overlap in semantic memory, which in turn relies on the presence of stored semantic information for both prime and target. Recognition of the target word is measured by a reaction time task such as lexical decision or pronunciation. Thus, participants are not explicitly asked to retrieve the meanings of the words that they encounter; facilitation is assumed to rely on semantic information automatically accessed as a result of their simply hearing or reading the prime word (to which they make no overt response). Although there has been some debate over the contribution of possible nonautomatic strategic components to the priming effect (e.g., Neely, 1991; Shelton & Martin, 1992) , it is clear that automatic activation of semantic information plays a role, at least in certain environments in which attempts are made to minimize participants' conscious awareness of the relations between primes and targets (Fischler, 1977; McNamara, 1992; Shelton & Martin, 1992) . Warrington and Shallice (1979) argued that the presence or absence of semantic priming can be exploited as an important criterion for distinguishing between disorders of storage and of access to semantic information. 2 The rationale was that patients with a storage deficit will show no priming because the underlying representations of prime and target are disrupted and so cannot be accessed automatically any more than voluntarily. If the problem is one of (voluntary) access, with the semantic representations themselves intact, these representations may be available to automatic access, and so a priming effect should be found. This argument has been widely accepted and has led to the use of priming for investigating patients' semantic memory impairments in a number of studies with aphasic stroke patients (Blumstein et al., 1982; Chenery et al., 1990; Milberg & Blumstein, 1981; Ostrin & Tyler, 1993) and patients with dementia of the Alzheimer type (e.g., Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989; Glosser & Friedman, 1991; Nebes, Martin, & Horn, 1984) . However, it is important to note that the interpretation of priming results must take into account the possibility that apparently "normal" priming effects may reflect partial degradation of underlying semantic representations (Chertkow et al., 1989; Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) . In a model of semantic memory in which concepts are represented by a pattern of activation over a set of semantic features (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Hinton & Shallice, 1991; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1993) , damage to stored representations may result in loss of some, but not all, of these features. In this case, priming could still be possible, supported by the remaining, intact features only. For example, in order for cat to prime dog, it may be enough that several features such as has four legs, has fur, has a tail, and so on are coactivated by prime and target (those features they have in common because they are both animals); other features specific to cats (has whiskers, meows, chases mice, and so on) and dogs (barks, chases sticks, and so on) might be lost without a consequent decrease in priming. Priming on the basis of partial representation could also be explained by a semantic network model (Collins & Loftus, 1975) ; activation links between the representations of cat and dog (or perhaps mediated by the superordinate cat-animaldog) would support priming even if the links between these words and other related nodes (cat-whiskers, dog-bark, and so on) have been lost.
Because partially damaged representations could also support priming, one cannot simply infer from the presence of semantic priming that a patient's semantic representations are fully intact and therefore that any apparent deficit on other kinds of tasks is located solely in controlled access to those representations. Is there anyway to distinguish between a pure access deficit and partial damage to stored semantic information? Although it is not clear what could count as deciding evidence, it is possible to move toward one or the other of the two types of account by investigating the pattern of priming results for a patient in detail, rather than simply establishing the presence or absence of significant priming per se (Moss & Tyler, in press) . One important indicator of partial degradation of semantic representations is a pattern of hyper-priming, as identified by Chertkow et al. (1989) for a group of Alzheimer's patients. In a lexical decision task, these patients showed very long reaction times in the control condition and abnormally large facilitation effects when targets were preceded by related primes. This is consistent with an account of priming supported by partially degraded featural representations. The reduced feature set would give rise to the long lexical decision times for words preceded by unrelated primes (semantic information playing an important role in lexical decision, [Balota, Ferraro, & Connor, 1991; James, 1975] ). Additional activation of some features shared by the prime may provide a disproportionately large processing benefit by pushing the 1 We explain our distinction between semantic and associative relations between words in the Materials and Design section further on.
2 Warrington and Shallice's (1979) original claims actually concerned an off-line version of the semantic priming task, which involves prompting or cuing the subject with various kinds of information related to the target. However, their arguments apply equally to the semantic priming task. level of activation required for a recognition decision above threshold more quickly. The link between the hyper-priming pattern and partial loss of semantic information is strengthened by the fact that hyper-priming was found particularly for words that appeared to be impaired for the patients according to other off-line measures. Words for which the patients had demonstrated intact semantic knowledge (in that they were able to answer probe questions about them) did not show this hyper-priming pattern, but rather a priming effect of the normal magnitude.
In addition to distinguishing hyper-priming from normal priming, another approach is to investigate priming for a range of different kinds of semantic information. If a patient shows normal priming for several different kinds of semantic property, this would support the view that the underlying semantic representation is intact. For example, if cat primes animal, whiskers, pet, and fur, as well as dog, the most plausible account is that the semantic representation for cat is intact and that deficits revealed by off-line tasks are due to problems with controlled access to that information (cf. Chenery et al., 1990 ). This conclusion would be less justified on the basis of priming for a single type of prime-target relationship, where partially preserved features, shared between that particular prime and target, would be an equally valid account. To infer intact representations from a single type of priming may be particularly risky when only category coordinate or superordinate materials are used (e.g., cat-dog, cat-animal), because a pattern of preserved superordinate information with damaged subordinate features has been suggested as a common characteristic of semantic storage disorders (Shallice, 1988; Warrington & Shallice, 1979) .
With these considerations in mind, we investigated the nature of P.P.'s semantic memory loss in a priming experiment, with the following predictions. First, if she has sustained an exhaustive disruption of semantic information for almost all words (the radical loss account, which seems intuitively plausible on the basis of the off-line battery results) we should find no priming. This prediction is unchanged from the original rationale; that is, if information is no longer adequately represented, then it cannot be accessed voluntarily or automatically. If on the other hand, P.P.'s impairment is primarily an inability to access intact semantic representations in a controlled, deliberate manner, as when probed in an off-line task, we would predict that she will show normal semantic priming. In order to provide support for the access deficit account, rather than partial degradation, this priming should be (a) of normal magnitude, (b) preferably with reaction times within the normal range, and (c) observed over different kinds of primetarget relationship. The third kind of account, partial damage to semantic representations because of loss of some semantic features, would be suggested by a pattern of abnormally large facilitation effects on long reaction times (hyper-priming) and by priming for some semantic properties and not others. Patterson, Graham, & Hodges, 1994) , only a brief summary is provided here. P.P., a 68-year-old right-handed ex-clerical officer presented in 1990 with a 2-year history of a progressive loss of naming ability for people, places, and things and problems with comprehension of nominal terms. Her fund of factual knowledge was radically impoverished. For example, when asked whether she had ever been to America, she replied, "What's America?" or when asked about her favorite food, "Food, food, I wish I could remember what that was." But her autobiographical and episodic knowledge remained reasonably intact. For example, she could remember appointments and keep track of family events. Her spontaneous speech was well articulated with normal prosody, and she was able to produce fluent and grammatically correct sentences, although conversation was punctuated by severe word-finding difficulties. CT and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans revealed a moderate degree of cerebral atrophy, more marked in the left hemisphere, particularly around the sylvian fissure. A positron emission tomography (PET) scan revealed hypometabolism in the left temporal (Brodmann Areas 20, 21, and 37) and inferior parietal lobe (Patterson et al., 1994) . Table 1 shows her performance on a set of standard neuropsychological tests when she first presented in 1990. These tests highlight her impaired conceptual and semantic abilities and relatively spared visuoperceptual skills and working memory.
P.P. was tested on a battery of tasks designed to probe central representational knowledge via different input and output modalities (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992; Hodges, Salmon, & Butters, 1992) . Table 2 shows that she was profoundly impaired on all these tasks compared with an age-matched control group. These results provide the main index of the severity of her semantic memory loss. The only task that revealed any preservation of semantic knowledge was picture sorting. P.P. was able to sort a set of pictures into living versus man-made categories with 100% accuracy (chance = 50%). However, she scored only 72% at the superordinate level and was no better than chance at the subordinate level.-1 Young controls. We tested a group of 20 young participants from our participant pool (native speakers of British English between the ages of 18 and 40 years). A second group of 14 young control participants were also tested on a short interstimulus interval (ISI) version of the priming task. Al! were paid for their participation.
Age-matched controls. We also tested a group of 8 control participants, matched in age to P.P. (mean age = 67 years, range = 62-77 years). These participants were also paid for their participation.
Materials and Design
Forty-eight prime-target word pairs were chosen to test priming for two main kinds of semantic relationship. Twenty-four of the pairs shared the kinds of category coordinate relation that has been widely used in previous experiments, both with normal participants (Lupker, 1984; Shelton & Martin, 1992) and with patients (Chertkow et al., 1989; Milberg & Blumstein, 1981) . These were taken from familiar superordinate categories, most of which are given in Battig and Montague's (1969) category norms (e.g., lettuce-cabbage, dog-cat, coat-hat) . The other 24 pairs were nouns that were not members of the same category but shared a functional semantic relation; half of these were such that the prime referred to something used to perform an action on the target (such as broom-floor where you use a broom to sweep a floor, umbrella-rain, where you use an umbrella to keep off rain) and half were such that the target referred to a typical component of the event or script evoked by the prime (such as Method Participants P.P. Because this case has been described in detail elsewhere (Hodges, Patterson, Funnell, & Oxbury, 1992; Hodges et al., 1993;  theater-play, where a play is something you see at a theater, restaurantwine, where wine is something you would get in a restaurant).
Because most of the words in the functionally related conditions referred to artifacts rather than natural kinds of things (because these have far more clearly defined functions), we made sure that we controlled for this dimension on the category coordinates. We did this to avoid any confounds between type of semantic relation between prime and target, and the semantic domain of the word pair, because several patients have been reported who have selective semantic memory deficits limited to a specific domain such as artifacts or living things (e.g., Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . Half of the pairs in the category coordinate condition came from artifact categories (e.g., clothing, furniture, vehicles). The other half came from a range of categories, mostly natural kinds (e.g., animals, people, jewels).
Because it was already necessary to have two separate versions of the experiment (one with the test pair and one with the corresponding (Hofland & Johansson, 1982) . b Familiarity and concreteness rated on a scale from 1 to 7 (Coltheart, 1981) .
unrelated control trial for each item), we were unable to assess the different types of semantic relationship for the same prime words. Such a design would have required several separate testing sessions, which was not feasible given that P.P.'s abilities were deteriorating rapidly at the time of this study. Therefore, functional and category relations were tested over different groups of 24 words. Primes and targets were closely matched across conditions for length, written frequency, familiarity, and concreteness-the main variables known to interact with priming effects. The category coordinate and functional items were also closely matched for the strength of the semantic relation between prime and target. A pretest was carried out in which a group of 17 control participants were asked to rate the degree of relatedness between the pairs of words on a scale from 0 to 9. Table 3 gives the mean written frequency, familiarity, concreteness, and semantic relatedness ratings for primes and targets in each condition, as well as example prime-target pairs of each type. The final variable controlled for across the material set was degree of normative association between prime and target. In addition to any specific type of semantic relationship, a pair of words may also be associated, as measured by a large percentage of participants giving the target as the first word that comes to mind when presented with the prime in a free association test. For example, over 60% of participants give dog in response to cat, but no participant gives horse in response to pig, although both pairs are clearly members of the superordinate category animal in the same way. Our previous priming experiments have shown that associative strength is an important determinant of the amount of priming found for a target, with associated words reliably receiving a "boost" in priming over semantically related but nonassociated items (although the latter still show a significant, but smaller effect; Moss et al., in press) . It is possible that associative priming is subserved by an additional spread of activation between frequently co-occurring words at a presemantic level (Glosser & Friedman, 1991; Moss et al., in press; Shelton & Martin, 1992) . If this is the case, we need to ensure that any priming for a patient with semantic memory loss cannot be attributed to this level of the system only (Shallice, 1989 , cited in Rapp & Caramazza, 1993 . Therefore, our materials were selected so that half of all pairs in each condition were strongly associated (M = 39.5%) and half were not associated in either the forward or backward direction (M = 0.75%). Association data were taken from Postman and Keppel (1970) as well as our own association norms from a minimum of 40 British English participants (Moss & Older, in press) .
Each target was paired with its related prime word and also with an unrelated control word that acted as a baseline. Control words were selected by re-pairing targets with semantically and phonologically unrelated primes within the test set. In order to avoid repetition of targets within a test list, we divided the materials into two versions, one with the related test pairing and one with the unrelated control pairing for each item. Materials from all conditions were fully counterbalanced across the two versions.
Task
Two reaction time tasks are widely used in semantic priming studies: lexical decision and pronunciation (Neely, 1991; Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, & Langer, 1984) . We established in pilot studies that P.P. was unable to perform either of these tasks with sufficient accuracy. However, she could perform a word monitoring task (cf. the implicit syntactic processing task used by Hodges et al., 1993) . We therefore developed a new priming task that exploited her ability to monitor for spoken target words rapidly and accurately. In this primed monitoring task, the participant presses a reaction time button as soon as she or he hears a word prespecified by the experimenter. Each trial consists of a list of words spoken with a constant interval between them. The lists vary from 5 to 10 words long. The target is always the last word of this variable-length list and is immediately preceded either by the related prime (in one version) or by the unrelated control word (in the other version of the experiment). Before each list starts, the participant is told the target word to monitor for. A timing pulse at the onset of the target word is stopped by the button press to give a measure of monitoring latency. A priming effect is shown if reaction times to monitor for targets are faster when they are preceded in the list by the related prime than when preceded by the unrelated control word.
The filler words preceding the prime-target pair in the lists were all semantically unrelated to the prime and target, and none started with the same phonological string as the target (so anticipation responses could be avoided). Length of filler words was balanced across trials from the different conditions. The target appeared in the same list in the two versions, with the sole difference being that the preceding word was the related prime in one version and the unrelated control in the other. A set of eight practice trials was also made.
Pilot studies established that the optimum ISI for P.P. was 1,500 rns. Control participants were also tested at this ISI. Because such a long ISI may have given control participants ample time to develop conscious response strategies that were not available to P.P., we also tested a group of young controls on the same experiment, but with a 200-ms ISI-approximately the shortest interval at which participants can keep up with the rate of presentation-to ensure that the pattern of results for the controls did not differ from that on the long-ISI task. Although the primed monitoring task has not been used in previous studies, there is evidence that a short ISI minimizes strategic priming effects in other reaction time tasks such as lexical decision (de Groot, 1984; Neely, 1991) . To further discourage strategic responding in the short-ISI task, we also included a set of catch trials in which there was a pseudoprime word in the list; this was a word related to the target but for which, unlike on test trials, one or more unrelated fillers intervened between prime and target. Catch trials were distributed randomly through the set and were the same in both versions.
Procedure
All materials were spoken by a female speaker of British English and recorded onto digital audiotape. They were then digitized at a sampling rate of 20 kHz onto computer hard disk. The stored speech files were played out for the experiment, either directly from the computer for the young control participants or from tapes for age-matched controls and P.P.
Young controls. Ten control participants were tested on each version of the experiment, in groups of up to 4 at a time. The target words were given to participants on printed cards, and they were allowed 7 s between each trial to turn to the next card and read the target word. The spoken word lists were played out by the computer over headphones with 1,500 ms between successive words. Participants used their dominant hand to press a button on a box in front of them when they heard the target word, thus stopping the timer and causing a reaction time to be stored on computer hard disk. The reaction time was measured from the acoustic onset of the target word to a time-out of 1,850 ms. The card showing the target word remained in view throughout the trial.
Young controls: Short-ISI task. Seven young controls who had not taken part in the first experiment were tested on each version. The procedure was as described earlier with the exception that the words in each list were separated by only 200 ms, and 10 catch trials were placed at random through the list. For technical reasons, the time-out was slightly shorter, at 1,725 ms.
Age-matched controls. Eight age-matched controls each completed both versions of the experiment, just like P.P. Testing sessions were separated by an interval of at least 1 week. Materials were played from a tape generated from the computer. Trigger pulses were placed at the onset of target words, which started a clock on a reaction time box. This clock was stopped by the participant's monitoring response (made with the dominant hand), and latencies were recorded by the experimenter. Age-matched control participants were also given the target word to read from a card, which remained in view throughout the trial.
P.P. P.P. was tested on both versions of the experiment in a single testing session in November 1991, with several hours separating the two versions. Although having P.P. perform both versions on the same day was not ideal, it seemed the best method of ensuring comparable responses across the two versions because P.P.'s deterioration at this stage was quite rapid. The experiment was run from tape, as it was for the age-matched controls, with response latencies recorded in the same way. Because she is a surface alexic reader , P.P. was told each target word by the experimenter, rather than reading it from a card. The experimenter repeated the target word as often as necessary until P.P. seemed to register the word, and the card was left in view throughout the trial as a reminder of the target word. 4 4 Ideally, testing procedures would be identical for P.P. and the age-matched controls. However, two slight differences should be noted. First, controls read the target words from cards, whereas P.P. heard the target word spoken by the experimenter. This was unlikely to affect performance, because the target was repeated several times, and P.P. was able to look at the card throughout the trial. Thus, there should have been little extra memory load associated with hearing rather than reading the word. Moreover, we have never observed any difference in monitoring performance for control participants as a function of whether the target word was read or spoken by the experimenter. Second, P.P. completed both versions of the experiment in 1 day, whereas the versions were separated by 1 week for the controls. It could be argued that the control participants would have shown a different pattern of results if they had been tested in the same day. However, in a study currently under way we have tested elderly controls in a similar primed monitoring study, both with versions presented in the same session and with versions separated by 1 week or more, and the results did not differ. 
Results

Young Controls
Anticipations (pressing the button before hearing the target) and time-outs accounted for 0.64% of the data. These missing data points, and values that fell above or below 2 standard deviations of the condition mean (3.7%) were replaced with that mean.
5 Means were then calculated over participants and items and entered into an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the following factors: Version x Semantic Type (category or functional) x Association (associated or nonassociated) x Prime Type (related or control). There was a large priming effect (related faster than control) for all conditions: Fl(l, 18) = 52,p < .001;F2(1, 39) = 94, p < .001. There was no difference in the amount of priming for associated items (70 ms) and nonassociated items (73 ms), Fl and F2 < 1, or in the amount of priming for category coordinates (67 ms) and functionally related items (75 ms), Fl and F2 < I. 6 However, there was a three-way interaction among prime type, semantic type, and association: Fl(l, 18) = 6.4, p < .05; F2 (1, 39) = 3.9, p = .054. This was due to there being greater priming in the category coordinate condition when items were associated than when they were not (113 ms vs. 51 ms, respectively), whereas in the functionally related condition the pattern was reversed (60 ms vs. 116 ms, respectively). In spite of these differences, the priming effect for each Semantic Type x Association condition was significant (p < .01 in participants and items analyses in all cases). There were no other reliable main effects or interactions.
7 Results are shown in Table 4 , collapsed over the variable of association.
Young Controls: Short-ISI Task
Anticipations and time-outs accounted for 1.22% of the data and were removed. These, and values that fell above or below 2 standard deviations from the conditions mean (4.2%) were replaced with that mean. Means were calculated and analyzed as for the 1,500-ms ISI task. The pattern of results was identical to that in the original experiment (see Table 4 ). There was a large priming effect (related faster than control) for all conditions: Fl(l, 12) = 28.9, p < .001;F2(1, 39) = 87,p < .001. There was no difference in the amount of priming for associated items (46 ms) and nonassociated items (56 ms), Fl and F2 < 1, or between category coordinates (48 ms) and functionally related items (52 ms), Fl and F2 < I. 8 The priming effect for each Semantic Type x Association condition was significant (p < .01 in participants and items analyses in all cases). This provides good evidence that primed monitoring does involve an automatic priming component that can still be found when the ISI is very short and thus prevents control participants from adopting conscious strategies for responding. In spite of this, priming was greater overall when the ISI was longer, which suggests that the control participants may have been able to develop strategies over and above the automatic priming component. However, because extensive tests of P.P.'s semantic memory have shown that she has almost no conscious awareness of word meanings, it is unlikely that she would be able to benefit from any such strategies. If P.P. shows priming in this task, it must be based on automatic, nonconscious processes.
Age-Matched Controls
Anticipations and time-outs accounted for 0.4% of the data. These, and values above or below 2 standard deviations of the condition mean (3.4%) were replaced with that mean. Mean reaction times were then calculated over participants and items and entered into an ANOVA as for the young controls, but with version as a within-subjects rather than between-subjects factor. The pattern of results was the same as for the young controls (see Table 4 ), with a significant overall priming effect: Fl(l, 6) = 15.5,p < .01; F2(l, 40) = 151,p < .001. There was no difference in the amount of priming between associated items (55 ms; range = 14-131 ms) and nonassociated items (51 ms; range = -24-109 ms),Fl and F2 < 1, or between category coordinates (50 ms; range = -24-131 ms) and functionally related items (55 ms; range = 14-129 ms), Fl and F2 < 1. The priming effect for each Semantic 5 Also, the data for one item in the functional condition were excluded because of experimenter error. This was corrected prior to testing of P.P. and the age-matched controls. 6 In lexical decision we find a consistent associative boost for normal participants, but this was not the case for primed monitoring, in which there was no effect of association. 7 The remaining effects were as follows: main effect of association, Fl(l, 18) = 8.3,p < .01, F2 < 1; semantic type, Fl(l, 18) = 10, p < .01,F2(1,39) = 1.1, p > .3; and version, Fl and F 2 < 1. There were no significant two-or three-way interactions other than those reported in the text. The four-way interaction among version, semantic type, association, and prime type was significant by participants but not by items: Fl(l, 18) = 35,p < .01;F2(1,39) = 1.6,p > .2. 8 Only two other effects were reliable over participants and items analyses. There was a main effect of semantic type, Fl(l, 12) = 35,p < .01, F2(l, 39) = 3.8, p < .06, with reaction times faster overall to category coordinates (327 ms) than to functionally related items (353 ms). However, this did not influence the priming effect for the two conditions in any way, as was shown by the lack of interaction between semantic type and prime type. There was also an interaction between version and prime type: Fl(l, 12) = 1.\\p < .05;F2(1,39) = 18.2,p < .01. This shows that one group of participants and one group of items primed to a greater extent than the other. However, the priming effects were all in the same direction (27 ms and 74 ms for the item groups, and 25 ms and 76 ms for the participant groups). This interaction does not affect the main pattern of results. Type x Association condition was significant (p < .01 for participants and items in all cases). 9
P.P.
As shown in Table 5 , P.P.'s reaction times were similar to those for the control subjects. Anticipations and time-outs accounted for 9.4% of the data. These, and data points that fell above or below 2 standard deviations of the mean for their condition (2.1%), were replaced with the condition mean. The data were then entered into an ANOVA (Version x Association x Semantic Type x Prime Type). P.P. showed a significant overall priming effect, F2(l, 40) = 4.9,p < .05. This effect did not differ statistically for associated (17 ms) and nonassociated items (57 ms), F2(l, 40) = 1.4, p > .1, or for category coordinates (9 ms) and functionally related items (66 ms), F2(l, 40) = 2.1,p > .1. There was, however, a significant interaction between version and prime type, F2(l, 40) = 10.9, p < .01. This was because there was an overall priming effect of 93 ms for one item group (those for which the related prime trial was in Version 1) but a -19-ms effect for the other item group (those for which the related prime trial was in Version 2).
Although there was no significant interaction between type of semantic relation and priming, further analyses revealed that P.P.'s 9-ms priming effect for category coordinates did not approach significance (F2 < 1), whereas the 66-ms effect for the functional condition was significant, F2(l, 20) = 6.8, p < .05. This suggests that there may be a difference between category coordinate priming and functional priming for P.P.
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To establish whether this was a real difference in priming effect for category and functional relations, we performed a replication study with P.P. 2 months after the first study. An additional reason for running the replication study was to determine whether the same priming effects would be found for a new set of items, and a new rotation of items over versions, which should have the effect of eradicating the Version x Prime Type interaction reported earlier.
P.P.: Replication Study
A new set of 48 word pairs was selected according to the criteria and constraints described for the first study. The design and procedure were identical to those of the first study, Only 4.2% of the data were replaced with the condition mean (1.4% missed targets and 3.1% values above 2 standard deviations of the mean). Mean reaction times in each condition are given in Table 5 . This time, there was no overall priming effect, F2 < 1. There was no sign of any interaction of version and prime type, F2 < 1. Thus, in this study there are no priming differences that are due to rotation of items over the two versions.
12 As before, there was no difference between priming for associated (-7 ms) and nonassociated items (9 ms), F2 < 1. But the effect of semantic type was now more marked than in the first study. Reaction times were faster overall to targets in the functionally related condition (298 ms) than the category coordinate condition (364 ms), F2(l, 40) = 13, p < .01. Priming effects also differed for the two types: 35 ms for functionally related items and a negative effect of -32 ms for category coordinates. This difference gave rise to a significant interaction, F2(l, 40) = 5.3, p < .05. Further analyses showed that the 35-ms effect for functionally related items was marginally significant, F2(l, 20) = 3.9, p = .07, whereas the -32-ms effect for category coordinates was not, F2(l,20) = l.9,p > .1. Table 5 also shows the results of the two studies combined. Over the two sets of materials there was a 50-ms priming effect for functionally related items and a negative effect of -11 ms for category coordinates. In a combined ANOVA that included the variable of study (1 or 2), this gave rise to a *p < .1. **p < .05.
< .01.
9 The only other significant effects were as follows. There was no main effect of version: Fl(l, 6) = 4.9, p = .06; F2(\, 40) = \,p > .3. However, there was a three-way interaction among version, association, and prime type: Fl(l, 6) = 30.4,p < .01; F2(l, 40) = 5.8,p < .05. This was because for one item group there was a greater priming effect for associated items than nonassociated items (64 ms and 41 ms, respectively) and for the other item group the pattern was the reverse (44 ms and 61 ms, respectively). But because the priming effects were in the same direction in all cases, and there was no overall effect of association on priming, this does not affect the main pattern of results.
10 One of the age-matched control participants also showed an absence of priming for category coordinates (-24 ms). However, this participant did not show any priming for the functional condition either (14 ms), and so the pattern is not the same as that for P.P. If we exclude this participant, the range of priming scores for the agematched control group is 34-131 ms for the category coordinates and 31-129 ms for the functional condition.
11 This showed that we need not have carried out both versions of the experiment in the same day for P.P. in the original study. However, we could not have foreseen that she would have maintained her monitoring ability so well while her performance in all other tasks was deteriorating so markedly. 12 The factor of version did, however, interact with semantic type, F2(l, 40) = 9.7, p < .01. This was mainly due to the overall reaction times to targets in the functionally related condition in one item group being faster than in the other item group and both category coordinate item groups. However, as this did not interact with the amount of priming in either the category coordinate or functionally related conditions, this does not affect the pattern of results. significant interaction between semantic relation type and prime type (related vs. control),F(\, 88) = 6.8,p < .01.
To rule out the possibility that P.P.'s differential priming for the functional and category coordinate relations was due to a selective impairment for natural-kind concepts compared with artifact concepts, we examined the priming effects for the natural-kind and artifact category coordinate subgroups separately. Collapsed over the two studies, the difference between related and control conditions was -17 ms for the artifact coordinates and -5 ms for the natural-kind coordinates. Artifact concepts fare no better than natural-kind concepts where coordinate priming is concerned, and so the significant priming for functionally related pairs (which were mostly artifacts) seems to depend on the type of semantic relation between prime and target, rather than on their general semantic domain per se. It is also important to note that, for the functionally related condition, P.P. showed priming for the nonassociated pairs (74 ms) as well as for the strongly associated items (25 ms). This counters the possible argument that priming is picking up effects of low-level lexical cooccurrence rather than relations between concepts in semantic memory.
Discussion
In the primed monitoring study P.P. showed significant priming for functionally related word pairs of the type broomfloor and theater-play. This priming effect was essentially normal in that both the absolute reaction times and the facilitation in the related condition were of a magnitude comparable to that for control participants. In contrast, she showed no sign of priming for category coordinate pairs such as dog-cat and bed-desk. This pattern of results was reliable over two studies with different sets of materials.
If we assume the access-storage distinction described earlier, these priming results suggest that we cannot characterize P.P.'s semantic memory loss as either one of access or of representation in general; rather, the nature of the impairment differs for different types of semantic information. On the one hand, the absence of priming for category coordinate word pairs, such as cat-dog, is consistent with P.P.'s having lost the stored information that encodes membership of a common semantic category. She cannot access this information deliberately (as shown by the poor performance in picture sorting at the superordinate level, for example) nor automatically (as shown by the absence of priming). For this type of information, then, the off-line and on-line results converge on the view that P.P. has sustained loss of stored information in semantic memory.
On the other hand, P.P. does seem able to automatically access information about the functional properties of objects and the typical elements of events and situations as revealed by the consistent, robust priming effect for pairs of words linked in these ways. Furthermore, this priming effect was found for functionally related word pairs that were both nonassociated and associated (pairs like oven-potato and restaurant-wine as well as hammer-nail and theater-play). This suggests that the underlying representations of this kind of information are relatively intact and that P.P.'s difficulties in understanding functional properties in the off-line tasks were due to impaired access processes. Although we did not carry out off-line tasks specifically designed to probe deliberate, controlled access to the specific functional relations tested in the priming experiment, all of the evidence suggests that P.P.'s performance would have been very poor in such a task. For example, she could not sort pictures according to functional attributes, such as British versus foreign animals or electrical versus nonelectrical appliances. In an object-mime task, she was able to show the correct use of only 8 out of 25 common objects and was not able to arrange objects into functional groups such as needle, thimble, and sewing cotton or candle and matches (Hodges et al., 1993) . She showed a clear dissociation between impaired deliberate access to functional information and intact automatic activation supporting priming. The automatic activation of functional information for P.P. was consistent with her relatively preserved ability to use objects appropriately to some degree in everyday life-for example, to dress herself or to eat a meal. The observation that patients with semantic dementia are often able to continue using objects correctly, even when they cannot explicitly retrieve any information about them, has been made by several other researchers (Saffran & Schwartz, 1992) . The current study demonstrates that this implicit knowledge can support automatic semantic priming in an experimental setting as well as everyday use of objects.
P.P.'s priming results are consistent in some ways with the third account of semantic memory loss we identified in the introduction: that there has been partial, rather than complete, loss of stored semantic information (Chertkow et al., 1989) . Perhaps P.P. has sustained damage to the information that connects members of the same category while information linking functionally related concepts is relatively spared, so that priming is supported for the latter type of relation but not the former. Of course, a separate account would also be required to explain why the intact functional information is not available to deliberate access processes. This kind of account seems more consistent with P.P.'s priming results than either the simple access or storage accounts, but a number of issues remain to be addressed.
The first problem is that P.P. showed no sign of hyperpriming for functionally related words. Chertkow et al. (1989) argued that partial degradation of semantic representations, owing to loss of semantic features on their account, would lead to long baseline reaction times and disproportionately large priming effects. However, P.P.'s baseline reaction times were within the normal range, as were her priming effects. Thus, her proposed loss of category coordinate information seems to have no consequences for monitoring times overall or for the priming effects of functionally related words.
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13 Chertkow et al.'s (1989) argument was based on the lexical decision task rather than primed monitoring. Although there is considerable evidence that lexical decision involves access to semantic representations (Balota et al. 1991; James, 1975) , we cannot be so certain of this for primed monitoring. Because primed monitoring is a new task, the relevant task analyses are not yet available. However, it is clear that semantic properties play some part in the monitoring response; otherwise we would not see reliable semantic priming effects for our control participants. We have recently carried out a further More fundamental, perhaps, is the question of why partial degradation of semantic representations should result in priming for functional relations but not category relations. If we adopt, for the moment, a distributed feature-based model of semantic memory, there are two ways in which progressive loss of semantic information may occur. The first is a general loss of increasing numbers of semantic features. If this were the case for P.P., we would expect category coordinate priming to be preserved rather than functional relation priming-the opposite of the observed effect. This is because the category coordinates generally have more semantic features in common than the functionally related pairs (compare coordinates like cat-dog and boat-ship with functionally related pairs like umbrella-rain and oven-potato). Any general loss of features should affect the functional pairs more severely than the category coordinates.
This would suggest the second possibility, that P.P.'s loss of semantic features is not general but restricted to certain types-specifically, the type of features shared by category coordinates. This kind of "selective feature loss" has been proposed as an account of category-specific semantic deficits and has been used as the basis for a successful computational model (Farah & McClelland, 1991) . Farah and McClelland argued that members of living-thing categories are characterized more by perceptual features than by functional features, whereas artifact categories have a similar number of each kind of feature. Damage to perceptual features in their model gave rise to performance characteristic of a selective deficit for living-thing categories. However, it is difficult to identify what "type" of semantic feature would have to be selectively damaged to yield P.P.'s priming performance. The lack of priming for category coordinates seemed to be general across different semantic domains (there was no difference between artifact and natural-kind categories). Any selective sparing of "functional" features (which would be necessary to explain priming for the functionally related items) might also be expected to give priming for the artifact category coordinates, which also share many functional properties. A similar problem applies to localist network models such as that of Collins and Loftus (1975) . Why would links between functionally related items be preserved, while those between members of the same category are lost? Thus, we do not yet have a principled account of why partial loss of semantic information should give rise to functional but not category coordinate priming.
We will discuss briefly two possible explanations of P.P.'s priming performance that do not rely on an arbitrary distinction between the kinds of features shared by category coordinates and functionally related word pairs. The first possibility is that there has been a generalized loss of semantic feature information affecting both coordinate and functional relations but that there is some additional way in which the relations series of experiments that compare semantic priming in the standard lexical decision task with that in primed monitoring, for a variety of semantic relation types, and have found that the pattern of priming is almost identical over the two tasks. Thus it is plausible to assume that the effect of partial degradation of semantic representations on primed monitoring will be similar to that on lexical decision. between the functional pairs are encoded that continues to support priming. What we are hypothesizing here is some kind of mentally represented script or event structure in which pairs of concepts, like umbrella and rain, broom and floor, and so on, are embedded (e.g., Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977) . In fact, we selected half of our functionally related items with this kind of script relation explicitly in mind (theater-play, restaurant-wine, and so on). It is possible that this level of event structure is relatively spared for P.P., and it is this that supports priming. On this account then, P.P. would have extensive loss of both category and functional information, but the residual information would be enough to access a stored event structure. Pattern completion processes would lead to other elements of the script's being activated, thus leading to priming. Coordinate pairs do not generally co-occur in these event structures and so do not prime. Although this account may explain why P.P. shows priming for functionally related words, a number of problems remain. A separate account is again required to explain why intact event structures do not seem to benefit P.P.'s performance on off-line tasks that involve controlled access to that information.
14 Second, it is not clear whether access to event structures on the basis of residual feature information would be sufficient to give rise to the essentially normal priming we saw for P.P. in the functional condition: A hyper-priming effect would be more consistent.
The second kind of account we consider is quite different in that it does not posit any significant loss of feature information. The absence of priming for category coordinates might be attributed not to the nature of the semantic representations themselves, but to the processes of word recognition by which activation of multiple semantically similar candidates is reduced to a single "recognized" word (Marslen-Wilson, 1987; Zwitserlood, 1989) . When a word is heard, other concepts that share many of the same features will also be activated. So, for example, hearing the word cat may activate features including is a mammal, has four legs, has a tail, is a pet, is feline, and so forth. Through overlap of many of these features, other concepts such as dog, kitten, and tiger will also be activated to varying degrees. To recognize a word, and specifically to respond in a priming task, it is necessary to come to some kind of decision that the word heard was cat, with all its appropriate semantic properties, rather than any of the other activated words. Because category coordinates share a great many features, any impairment in this "decision process" could lead to interference in recognizing a word as being cat when the prime word dog has just been heard. That is, there may be some kind of interference effect between words that have a high degree of overlap that would counteract any priming effect for category coordinates but not for functionally related 14 We cannot be certain on this point because we have not been able to carry out off-line tests specifically designed to probe script or event knowledge. However, P.P.'s poor performance on the object pairing task mentioned in Footnote 9 suggests that she has a problem with deliberate access to at least some script-type information. The current results highlight the importance of developing otf-line tests of scriptbased knowledge for future cases. pairs, which share fewer features and so are more easily discriminable.
On this account, P.P.'s primary semantic impairment is one of controlled access to semantic information, with relatively intact underlying representations, accompanied by an impairment of the processes involved in discriminating between the activation levels of competing semantically similar concepts (or in the activation functions themselves). This would also be consistent with some degree of overall feature degradation, which would render the highly similar category coordinates even more confusable. One problem with this account is that it would seem to predict that P.P. will make a large number of anticipations in the monitoring task when she hears the category coordinate prime, confusing it with the target. This was not the case, because P.P. made almost no anticipations at all.
Before concluding, we should consider a final type of explanation that could be suggested to account for P.P.'s dissociation of priming for category and functional relations-that it reflects the capacities for the automatic activation of some types of semantic information in the right cerebral hemisphere. This might be possible given that the CT and MRI scans revealed greater atrophy in the left than the right hemisphere and that the PET scan showed hypometabolism in the left temporal and inferior areas only. However, this does not seem to be a plausible account of P.P.'s priming data for two main reasons. The first is that lateralized priming studies with normal participants, in which primes and targets are presented to one hemisphere only, provide no support for the idea that functional relations are processed in the right hemisphere, whereas category coordinate relations are not (which would need to be the case to explain P.P.'s priming results as being supported by right-hemisphere processes). Although results have been mixed, a series of studies by Chiarello and colleagues have suggested that the right hemisphere is capable of supporting category coordinate priming to a greater rather than lesser extent than the left hemisphere, particularly when the prime and target are not strongly associated (Chiarello, Burgess, Richards, & Pollock, 1990; Chiarello & Richards, 1992) . Although there have been fewer lateral priming studies using functionally related materials, Chiarello et al. (1990) found that there was little evidence of priming for functional relations in either hemisphere alone, which is also inconsistent with a claim that P.P.'s priming for functional relations is due to the intact functioning of the right hemisphere.
Further evidence against the idea that P.P. is showing relatively intact right hemisphere priming comes from our priming studies with aphasic stroke patients (including nonfluent, fluent, and anomic patients), all of whom have shown essentially normal priming for both category coordinates and functionally related items. (Ostrin & Tyler, in press; Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, in press ). These patients all have extensive left hemisphere lesions. Most strikingly, a PET scan for 1 of the nonfluent patients, J.G., revealed a complete absence of metabolic function in the left hemisphere.
15 Thus, there is no simple association between damage to the left cerebral hemisphere and a pattern of functional priming without category priming. However, it will be necessary to carry out further priming studies with other patients to determine whether this pattern of results is unique to P.P. or will generalize to other patients with semantic dementia. It is also possible that a similar dissociation in priming would be found for patients with other types of progressive disorder, such as dementia of the Alzheimer type. Although several studies have now been reported that investigated priming in this patient population (e.g., Chertkow et al., 1989; Glosser & Friedman, 1991; Nebes et al., 1984) , these studies did not distinguish between priming effects for different kinds of semantic relation; rather, they used a mixture of semantic relations or a single type of relation (usually category coordinates) only. Thus, these studies were not sensitive to differences in priming for category and functional relations.
In summary, P.P.'s pattern of results on the on-line primed monitoring task, together with her uniformly impaired performance on the battery of off-line tasks, cannot be accounted for straightforwardly as either an access or a storage deficit. The nature of P.P.'s semantic memory loss is complex and sensitive to the type of semantic information being probed. Although all kinds of information appear to be equally inaccessible under deliberate control, there is "preservation" of certain kinds of functional information when automatic access is probed. We say "preservation" in quotes because this information was still effectively lost to P.P. in spite of her remarkably normal priming. We have offered two possible accounts of P.P.'s priming results, one in terms of degraded feature representations with relatively intact event structure representations and the other in terms of interference between the activation levels of very similar semantic representations. There are problems with both types of account, and their evaluation will depend on detailed computational modeling as well as further studies of patients with similar semantic memory impairments. In addition, neither account provides any explanation of P.P.'s inability to access any semantic information under deliberate control, including the functional information for which she showed priming. This, too, must be the focus of future research.
